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Building on my recently published book Contaminations: Beyond Dialectics in Modern 
Literature, Science and Film, this article questions various critical approaches that assume that 
the modern and the tragic are mutually exclusive. The theoretical proposition of this article is 
that the exclusion of the tragic from the modern can be most convincingly circumvented via a 
theory of contaminations. As J M Bernstein has recently pointed out, philosophical systems 
such as Hegel dialectics attempt to marginalize the impact of the tragic on social life:  
 
Philosophy could only begin its authorizing of a rational world by excluding tragedy, or by 
following the magnificent examples of Aristotle and Hegel, who saw clearly the claim of 
tragedy and sought to include it within philosophy’s serene rational construction of the world. 
But tragedy -- the slaughter-bench and human wreckage -- cannot be excluded or included 
because our disasters and sufferings are not external accretions to our triumphs; as Walter 
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Benjamin puts it, “There is no document of civilization that is not at the same time a document 
of barbarity.1 
 
 My notion of contaminations highlight the simultaneity of what dialectics spaces out as binary 
oppositions (barbarity does not so much give rise to what it is apparently opposed --i.e. 
civilization -- but instantiates its opposite at the same time). A theory of contamination relates 
to dialectical ways of thinking while eliding their stricture of inclusion and exclusion. Rather 
than positing ‘pure’ entities which are mutually opposed with each other such as progress and 
regression, contaminations goes beyond dialectics by simultaneously allowing for the co-
presence of what appears to be irreconcilable. My theory of contaminations can be best 
described by what Walter Benjamin has called “dialectics at a standstill.” As I have recently 
argued, Benjamin advances a critique of the progression form what is considered to be negative 
to the positive (that takes place in dialectics) when he proposes his notion of the image which 
constitutes a contamination of sorts; or, as Benjamin puts it, a constellation.2 This is especially 
relevant to issues of temporality as they concern modern tragedy. The past to which Benjamin 
refers could be another word for what the tragic modern self remembers in its interior sphere: 
“It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what 
is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together with the now to form a 
constellation. In other words it is dialectics at a standstill.”3 As I have proposed elsewhere 
contamination happens when dialectics becomes arrested and two terms which are in dialectical 
                                                          
1 Bernstein, “Tragedy” in Richard Eldridge (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Literature, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 71-94 (p.91).  
2 Mack Contaminations: Beyond Dialectics in Modern Literature, Science and Film, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2016), pp. 107-12 
3 Benjamin The Arcades Project, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, prepared on the basis of 
the German volume edited by Rolf Tiedemann, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2002), p. 463 
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opposition cease to be so and instead entangle each other in an image wherein none demeans 
the other.4 
As regards temporality, tragedy in its modern form is concerned with how the 
promises of modernity—scientific progress, autonomy, freedom and equality —play out in 
the life of its inhabitants. Strindberg’s Miss Julie attempts to realize these promises, while 
Samuel Beckett shows us how the expectancy that accompanies such hopes may leave us 
trapped in a futile waiting game. There are certain continuities between modern and ancient 
tragedy: the most striking is the investigation into humanity’s limits as manifested in the 
persistence of terror and fear—what Aristotles calls eleos (fear) and phobos (terror)—
inducing aspects of our lives such as suffering and mortality.5 Perhaps the most distinctive 
feature of modern tragedy is its position within a scientific context which has abandoned 
religious affiliations. Rather than passing judgement on its protagonists or merely using its 
characters as a means to exemplify a pre-established religious or social world view, modern 
tragedy observes what happens to us in an age that has itself become scientific. In a quasi-
scientific manner, modern tragedy observes the effect of science on the workings of the mind.  
 August Strindberg was the dramatist who perhaps most provocatively helped to refute 
the mutual exclusion of science and tragedy, of the modern and the tragic. As Sue Prideux has 
recently put it, Strindberg analysed and experimented with the psyche as a medical anatomist 
would dissect the biological constitution of the body: “the author took the corpse of the person 
he knew best—himself—and learned anatomy, physiology, psychology and indeed the whole 
history of the world from the carcass.”6  Strindberg embarks on writing what could be called 
‘an anatomy of the soul’. In his foreword to Miss Julie he accentuates his scientific approach 
                                                          
4 Mack Contaminations, pp. 1-22. 
5 For a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s notion of eleos and phobos see Wolfgang Schadewaldt’s Antike und 
Gegenwart: Über die Tragödie, (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1966), pp. 16-66. 
6 Prideaux, Strindberg: A Life, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), p. 3.  
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towards tragedy: “I myself find the joy of life in its strong and cruel struggles, and my pleasure 
in learning, in adding to my knowledge.”7 Science—learning and knowledge—here becomes 
entangled with a peculiar tragic, cathartic (as Aristotle would put it) or joyful recognition of 
often cruel transformations.  The reference to strong and cruel struggles evokes Charles 
Darwin’s On the Origins of Species (1859). 
Far from trumping the card of progress and improvement, Darwin draws attention to 
changes within the natural world that can often be quite cruel. As Gillian Beer has pointed out 
Darwin’s evolutionism also includes a tragic vision of nature’s dark, painful side: “So although 
Darwin gave some considerable emphasis to the language of progress and improvement, 
generating an onward and upward motion in much of his storytelling, these tales were 
constantly under the pressure of other, darker stories—of rapine, degradation, and loss.”8 
Changes are part of painful struggles which are driven by chance rather than by a pre-ordained 
design. Darwin has abandoned the conceptual framework of a goal written into the fabric of 
nature which would guarantee improvement towards perfection—what the term teleology 
denotes.  
Strindberg’s notion of struggle adumbrates Darwin’s famous term “natural selection” 
with which Darwin differentiates his scientific approach from that of the traditional natural 
theologians and their preoccupation with “design and creation.”9 As Beer has shown, 
“Darwin, on the contrary was trying to precipitate a theory based on production and 
mutation.”10 Strindberg combines Darwin’s scientific shift from traditional conceptions of 
order, design or teleology to an empirical observation of chance happenings with Nietzsche’s 
                                                          
7 Strindberg, Twelve Major Plays, translated from the Swedish by Elizabeth Sprigge, (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2009), p. 63.  
8 Beer, Darwin’s Plot: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction, Second 
Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. xix.  
9 Beer, Darwin’s Plot, p. xviii. 
10 Ibid.  
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philosophical investigations into the power struggles that are at work in accepted moral 
categories of just and unjust or good and evil.11  
 
Indeed, the reading of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil so deeply resonated with 
Strindberg that he started a correspondence with the philosopher wherein he explicitly 
established a connection between Darwin’s evolutionism and the Nietzschean questioning of 
moral categories: “ ‘Here’s evolution!’”12  Nietzsche uncovers in seemingly innocuous 
notions such as ‘justice’ or ‘equality’ what could be called the psychology of the hatred of the 
Other. As Robert Pippin has recently pointed out, Nietzsche’s psychological anthropology 
brings to the fore the historical failure of Hegel’s teleological (necessity based) account of 
freedom:  
 
Somehow the “realization” of freedom that had counted so heavily for the preeminent 
bourgeois philosopher, Hegel, had within the space of sixty years come to count for a 
great deal less, psychologically, in the sense used here. It was Hegel who mounted the 
most ambitious case for the rationality of modern forms of ethical life and who 
insisted most emphatically that rationality was not an abstract ideal, imperfectly but 
ever more successfully achieved, but that such rationality had, to use the Nietzschean 
word, a “life” in the historically actual social practices of giving and demanding 
justifications form each other (Pippin 2011: 122). 
 
Could it be the case that Nietzsche attempts to outline an alternative to a concept of freedom 
which is based on teleology and necessity (such as Aristotle’s and later Kant’s and Hegel’s)? 
                                                          
11 As Prideaux has pointed out, Strindberg’s scientific approach was heavily influenced by the German 
Darwinist Ernst Haeckel: “He was working on his scientific studies according to the Monist principles of Haeckel 
and he was yearning for the more stimulating members of the Berlin circle as he tried to prove the theory 
postulated by Haeckel: that the chemical world obeyed the same cycle of eternal transmutation as the natural 
world. Haeckel had suggested that elements were evolutionary products generated by combinations of varying 
numbers of primal atoms (the atom was a half-known entity; atomic number had yet to be discovered). 
Haeckel’s proposal was that as combinations of atoms, the elements might not be immutable but 
transmutable.” Prideaux, Strindberg, p. 187. 
12 Prideaux, Strindberg, p. 16. 
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Nietzsche argues for a type of freedom which embraces life’s plurality and contingency. In 
this way Gilles Deleuze has characterized Nietzsche’s philosophical project as an affirmation 
of the Other: “the sense of Nietzsche’s philosophy is multiplicity, becoming and chance are 
objects of pure affirmation. The affirmation of multiplicity is the speculative proposition, just 
as the joy of diversity is the practical proposition.”13 Nietzsche’s critique of the notion of 
equality is part of his attempt to undermine a homogenous understanding of freedom and 
rationality in terms of necessity and teleology.  
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra detects the most violent impulses behind rational demands for 
justice and equality. What precisely arouses such violence? Here the shadow of a traditional 
homogenous conception of universalism looms large: ““We want both to call bad names and 
take revenge on all those who are not like us,””14 the snake says in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. 
Moral denunciations here turn out to partake of the struggle for power.  
The servant Jean in Strindberg’s Miss Julie gains the upper hand over his social 
superior precisely through the power he exerts by calling her first mad and then sinful. At this 
point critics have misread Strindberg as taking side with the servant Jean. As we will see, 
however, Strindberg recasts tragedy in a quasi-scientific mode: the drama enables us to 
observe rather than to condemn the protagonists on view. Sue Prideaux follows the critical 
consensus when she interprets Jean as ‘superhuman’ (the übermensch) and Julie as subhuman 
(untermensch): “Instead, in an age when, largely, class and lineage were destiny, Strindberg 
took Ludwig Hansen with his slave blood (ditto the servant Jean in the play) to represent the 
übermensch thoroughly capable of changing the world through their will to power, whereas 
the Countess Frankenau (ditto Miss Julie), those two last weak dribbles of pure blood, were 
                                                          
13 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, translated by Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), p. 186. 
14 Nietzsche, Friedrich Kritische Studienausgabe. Vol. 4, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 
(Munich: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980), p. 128. My translation.   
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the untermensch.”15 Rather than celebrating the triumph of the superior over the inferior 
Strindberg’s tragedy depicts how Miss Julie courts her own downfall by courageously 
flaunting the heavily moralized class and gender system of her time. In his conversation with 
his fellow servant Kristin, Jean evokes the overall societal framework in which morality is a 
question of one’s social position. Miss Julie offends the moral system precisely by not acting 
according to her social standing:  
 
Jean: Our young lady—to come back to her—hasn’t any proper respect for herself 
and her position. I mean she isn’t refined. In the Barn just now she dragged the 
gamekeeper away from Anna and made him dance with her—no waiting to be asked. 
We wouldn’t do a thing like that. But that’s what happens when the gentry try to 
behave like the common people—they become common….16 
 
It is, however, highly questionable whether the highly eccentric Julie could accurately be 
called ‘common’. She questions commonly accepted ways of behavior—most prominently 
and provocatively those of class and gender. She turns the class system upside down when 
she orders her servant Jean not to accept her orders: “Don’t take it as an order. To-night we’re 
all just people enjoying a party. There’s no question of class.”17 This refutation of her own 
high class standing, confirms Jean’s suspicion that she is insane: “She really is crazy.”18 At 
first Jean attempts to make Julie aware of how her uncommon behavior will turn her into 
someone even worse than a member of the lower, common people: 
 
Julie: You, I take it, are an aristocrat. 
Jean: Yes I am. 
Julie: And I am coming down in the world. 
Jean: Don’t come down, Miss Julie. Take my advice. No one will believe you came 
down of your own accord. They’ll all say you fell.19   
                                                          
15 Prideaux, Strindberg, p. 17. 
16 Strindberg, Twelve Major Plays, p. 77. 
17 Strindberg, Twelve Major Plays, p. 79. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Strindberg, Twelve Major Plays, p. 83. 
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Julie here ridicules social hierarchies, whereas Jean aspires to climb the social ladder, calling 
himself an aristocrat. At this stage, however, Jean means it well. He tries to make Julie aware 
that the class system instantiates various cruel struggles which partake of the exertion of 
power. He implicitly refers to Nietzsche’s analysis of moralism as instrument through which 
we denigrate others. He tries to put an end to Julie’s eccentric behavior by warning her of the 
real harm it invites: 
 
Jean, rising: We can’t go on like this, Miss Julie. Someone might come in and see us. 
Julie: Why would that matter? 
Jean: For the simple reason that they’d talk. And if you knew the way their tongues 
were wagging out there just now, you…20 
 
By the people who are wagging their tongues Jean implicitly refers to the violence that goes 
with moralistic denunciation as analyzed by Nietzsche. Nietzsche sheds light on the 
immorality of moral denigrations (or ‘bad name calling’). Strindberg, however, adopts the 
more neutral approach of a scientific observer á la Darwin who registers and analyses 
empirical facts.  The plot of the tragedy is itself based on an empirical event as Strindberg 
emphasizes in his foreword:  
 
When I took this theme from a true story told me some years ago, which made a deep 
impression, I saw it as a subject for tragedy, for as yet it is tragic to see one favoured 
by fortune go under, and still more to see a family heritage die out, although a time 
may come when we have grown so developed and enlightened that we shall view with 
indifference life’s spectacle, now seeming brutal, cynical and heartless.21  
 
In this crucial quotation Strindberg brings together tragedy, the Enlightenment and the 
indifference of the scientific observer. Strindberg observes and analyses but he abstains from 
                                                          
20 Strindberg, Twelve Major Plays, p. 82. 
21 Strindberg, Twelve Major Plays, p. 62.  
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passing judgement: “But, to begin with, there is no such thing as absolute evil; the downfall of 
one family is the good fortune of another, which thereby gets a chance to rise, and, fortune 
being only comparative, the alternation of rising and falling is one of life’s principal charms.”22 
In contrast to some critics (such as Prideaux) Strindberg abstains from passing moral judgement 
on Julie. He rather sees her as phenomenon of modern times. Modernity is transitional and 
Julie’s wavering between the new and the old embodies this hybrid state of what Strindberg 
considers modern: “But Miss Julie is also a relic of the old warrior nobility now giving way to 
the new nobility of nerve and brain.”23 Strindberg’s expression ‘nerve and brain’ describes the 
psychological concern of modern tragedy. Tragedy has always been preoccupied with 
knowledge or its lack. Aristotle’s notion of harmatia denotes the tragic hero’s epistemological 
limits which in turn exemplify the restrictions which constitute the human condition. Harmatia 
is a blindness which prevents humanity to perceive the consequences of freely chosen actions 
which by hindsight reveal themselves to be tragic. Strindberg translates tragedy’s traditional 
concern with knowledge and its human limitations into the modern scientific arena of 
psychology and psychiatry. This is why the play Miss Julie has a rather circumscribed ambient 
which revolves around the mental life of only two protagonists. The plot is no longer an issue. 
Instead the internal workings of the mind move front and centre: 
The plot speaks for itself, and as it really only concerns two people, I have concentrated 
on these, introducing only one minor character, the cook, and keeping the unhappy 
spirit of the father above and behind the action. I have done this because it seems to me 
that the psychological process is what interests people most today. Our inquisitive souls 
are no longer satisfied with seeing a thing happen; we must also know how it happens. 
We want to see the wires themselves, to watch the machinery, […].24 
Modern tragedy analyses the way the mind work. In doing so it questions preformed positions 
about class, psychology, religion, science and gender. In Miss Julie tragedy in a scientific 
                                                          
22 Ibid.  
23 Strindberg, Twelve Major Plays, p. 66. 
24 Strindberg, Twelve Major Plays, p. 69. 
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manner discovers novel ground. It unfolds a case history which makes us see anew what it 
means to life in modernity. As Michael Levenson has put it: 
 In its modernist aspect, case history resists classification according to type and class; 
it moves instead toward the Strindbergian recognition: that existing categories (such as 
“character”) cannot account for the indeterminacy hidden beneath a proper name. We 
can begin to speak of the modernist case, I propose, when the self defies canons of 
intelligibility […]. The specification of a conundrum—the obscurity of motives, the 
demand for new methods of understanding, the shock effect of newly disclosed habit 
and appetites—is the project of modernist case study, which lives on the border between 
art and sciences (and pseudosciences) of human behaviours.25 
 
By now this modernist approach to drama as arena wherein we can experience and perhaps 
discover new aspects of our socio-psychic constitution also informs quality TV—what Dana 
Polan has recently called the “popular modernism” of The Sopranos. The famous TV series 
The Sopranos opens with Tony Soprano contemplating a statute in the waiting room of his 
psychiatrist Dr. Melfi. Two aspects of this opening scene are strikingly related to the itinerary 
of modern drama: the focus on the workings of the mind which is highlighted through the 
psychiatric setting and a peculiar contemplation of art. The contemplation in question here is 
peculiar because it seems to be futile. The camera focuses on Tony Soprano’s critical and 
searching gaze—it moves from a close-up of his contemplative face back to a corresponding 
close-up of the statute and back again to the face—but the back and forth between the mind 
looking for meaning and the aesthetic object it focuses on does not seem to yield any 
meaningful result. One could read this scene as one of the prime examples of a postmodern 
quest for significance which produces nothing else but nothingness: the emptiness of the gaze 
of a mob boss.  
                                                          
25 Michael Levenson, Modernism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp 77-78. 
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A futile quest for meaning is nevertheless significant—even if it does not establish recognizable 
symbols of the meaningful. Perhaps the most obvious example of such futile attempt to find 
some lost meaning is Beckett’s Waiting for Godot. This play hovers between modernism and 
postmodernism one might say. What is crucial here is that it harks back to an arch modernist 
text, Kafka’s parable Before the Law. Beckett acknowledged the closeness of his way of writing 
to that of Kafka. As Dirk van Hule and Mark Nixon have recently pointed out, in “his letter of 
17 February 1954, for instance, he claimed that he had stopped reading Kafka’s Das Schloss 
toward the end, because he felt too much at home—‘je m’y suis senti chez moi, trop’ (LSB II 
462).”26 A striking difference between Beckett and Kafka’s approach to a terrifying type of 
comedy concerns the different forms it takes in the two writers. Beckett’s writing registers 
disturbances, whereas Kafka’s writes in a detached or matter of fact way. As Beckett “told 
Ruby Cohn, ‘What struck me as strange in Kafka was that the form is not shaken by the 
experience it conveys’ (letter to Ruby Cohn, 17 January 1962).”27 
In such striking calm manner, Kaka’s parable Before the Law introduces a remarkable 
destruction of traditional metaphysics and ethics: it reduces classical or theological or 
metaphysical meaning to the meaninglessness of pointless waiting rather than actively 
searching. Later on in his first session with Dr. Melfi, Mr Soprano highlights his longing for 
what he bemoans as the contemporary loss of action. He has come too late. As a result he has 
missed the action. Gary Cooper embodies the wordless world of action: “What happened to 
Gary Cooper—the strong silent type?”28 Instead of action and drama, contemporary American 
society reduces even the most ruthless—an aspiring member of the mob—to the perceived 
                                                          
26 Van Hule and Nixon, Samuel Beckett’s Library, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 221.  
27 Van Hule and Nixon, Samuel Beckett’s Library, p. 101. 
28 The Sopranos. Series One. First Episode 
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passivity of reflection and worse still, to a state of depression or paralysis as physically 
manifested in Mr Sopranos’s panic attack.  
Tony Soprano’s gaze seems to be searching and yet the search in question turns out to 
be nothing else but part of a paradoxical activity which is passive: what one does when one 
‘kills time’. It is this passive activity which is the subject here rather than a study of character. 
The paradox of passive activity highlights what the anti-hero Tony Soprano lacks in dramatic 
terms at the very opening of this long winded drama or, more precisely, soap opera. The 
opening scene to the entire series pivots around the absence of not only action but also goal-
inspired contemplation: it simply presents us with the passivity and futility of waiting.  
The Sopranos is of course a work of popular culture but one that has taken its cues from 
modernism and modern drama. The futility of action and the absence of a meaningful goal are 
prime characteristics of modern drama, art and literature. The Greek Aristotelian name for aims 
or goals and transcending meanings is the word telos. In his Poetics Aristotle famously argues 
that a purging of the emotions, a catharsis, is the aim or the telos of tragedy.  
One of the crucial questions for modern tragedy is: What happens to tragedy once we 
have lost aims, goals and transcendental meanings—in short teleology? In many ways 
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, Kafka’s parable Before the Law, and in its postmodern pop-
culture form The Sopranos are concerned with and driven by this question of lost gaols and 
actions— or, more precisely, by the purported loss of drama and action. 
 In Kafka’s parable a man from the countryside (a simple haaretz) encounters a guard 
who will not let him enter the portals of the law. Crucially the door-keeper denies entrance 
with reference to time: “A man from the country comes to this door-keeper and asks for entry 
into the law. But the door-keeper says that he cannot grant him entry now. The man considers 
and then asks if that means he will be allowed to enter later. ‘It is possible,’ says the door-
13 
 
keeper, ‘but not now’.”29 The parable revolves around the expectations between now and 
later which too seem to motivate the passive activity of futile waiting in Beckett’s famous 
play: 
Vladimir: One can bide one’s time. 
Estragon: One knows what to expect.  
Vladimir: No further need to worry. 
Estragon: Simply wait. 
Vladimir: We’re used to it.30  
 
The knowledge in question here is empty though. Waiting furthers expectations and 
expectations seem to rationalize the continuation of mere waiting. We do not really know 
what to expect, except some form of security.  The play closes with a note on further waiting 
until either death or Godot were to arrive. Here the intellectual or spiritual dimension of any 
expectations ascribed to the name Godot become apparent: 
Vladimir: We’ll hang ourselves tomorrow. [Pause] Unless Godot comes. 
Estragon: And if he comes? 
Vladimir: We’ll be saved.31  
 
There is one protagonist who is called Lucky because he has abandoned all expectations. In 
the futile life of Waiting for Godot luck coincides with the loss of hope—or as Kafka has put 
it, “there is an infinite amount of hope, but not for us.” Estragon and Vladimir remain 
expectant. This is why they keep waiting for Godot. 
                                                          
29 Kafka, The Trial, translated by Idris Parry, (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 166. 
30 Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works, (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), p. 37 
31 Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 88 
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This expectancy of the protagonists in Kafka’s parable ‘Before the Law’ and in 
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot turns out to be the tragic and yet also the comic component of a 
modern form of drama that is curiously lacking in precisely the dramatic or eventful.  
Nothing happens except that the play enacts the ‘waiting’ announced in its title. As in Kafka 
short stories, Beckett’s dramas turn from the metaphorical to the literal. It is this translation 
of sings into enactments—Waiting for Godot literally depicts waiting—which accounts for 
both the comic and the tragic aspects of Beckett’s plays. The American writer David Forster 
Wallace has described this unsettling mixture of the comic and the tragic as follows: 
And it is this, I think, that makes Kafka’s wit inaccessible to children whom our 
culture has trained to see jokes as entertainment and entertainment as reassurance. It’s 
not that students don’t “get” Kafka’s humor but that we’ve taught them to see humor 
as something you get—the same way we’ve taught them that a self is something you 
have. No wonder they cannot really appreciate the central Kafka joke: that the horrific 
struggle to establish a human self results in a self whose humanity is inseparable from 
that horrific struggle. That our endless and impossible journey toward home is in fact 
our home.32  
 
The comic is disturbing and perhaps even terrifying here, because it unsettles our accustomed 
hopes and expectations. Waiting is a draining experience for Vladimir and Estragon—one 
that gives rise to suicidal ideation: “Vladimir: “We’ll hang ourselves tomorrow.”33 It is as if 
Kafka, and following him Beckett, took issue with the tragedy of banal, almost ridiculous, 
ordinary, every-day life filled as it is with tedious, uneventful tasks which render us passive, 
waiting subjects. Here the tedium of modern bureaucracy mutates from the comic to the 
tragic, from the innocuous to the monstrous, from innocence to guilt. Michael Levenson has 
recently used the term ‘Kafka effect’ for this point of indistinction between the comic and the 
tragic in modern drama and literature at large:  
                                                          
32 Wallace, Consider the Lobster and other Essays, (London: Abacus, 2007), pp.64-65.  
33 Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works, p. 88. 
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The ‘Kafka effect’ is to show that simplicity—simple words, clearly drawn events—is 
both a property of the banal and the catastrophic. The reading of a letter and the 
headlong rush to suicide can both be told in the same straightforward prose. This 
recognition may be the closest link between Kafka and Freud: not the schematic 
rendering of the Oedipus conflict but the continuity between everyday life and 
extreme states, between familiar gestures and uncanny outcomes.34    
The uneventful, the seemingly innocuous passing of time here turns from the banal or comic 
to the deadly, the catastrophic or, in short the tragic. Nothing happens and then all over 
sudden we are told that we have come too late: “The door-keeper realizes that the man has 
reached the end of his life and, to penetrate his imperfect hearing, he roars at him: ‘Nobody 
else could gain admittance here, this entrance was meant only for you. I shall now go and 
close it’.”35 As in Beckett there are two different forms of time: one that is endlessly filled 
with the boredom of waiting and the accompanying diminution of hope or expectancy and 
then the sharp, brief and yet bristling point of disappointment and pain.  
Similar to the signifier Godot in Beckett’s play, the portals of the law evoke the 
promise of knowledge, scientific insight and intellectual fulfilment which supposedly should 
be open, available and attainable for everyone. The door keeper, however, intimidates the 
naïve man from the country: “Such difficulties had not been expected by the man from the 
country; the law is supposed to be accessible to everyone and at all times, he thinks, but as he 
now looks more closely at the door-keeper in his coat of fur, at his great pointed nose and his 
long and straggly black beard, he decides that it would be better to wait until he gets 
permission to enter.”36 Expectation partakes of disappointment. Those who wait are co-opted 
by the lofty promise of what they are longing for. As a result they keep on waiting without 
questioning what they are doing, or rather not doing. In modern tragedy agency falls prey to 
temporality: to the empty, non-dramatic, uneventful drift of time.  
                                                          
34 Levenson, Modernism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 87-88. 
35 Kafka, The Trial, p. 167 
36 Kafka, The Trial, p. 166. 
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The question of time which here becomes a matter of waiting—of wasting or killing 
time as with Tony Soprano in the waiting room of his psychiatrist—replicates the futility of 
socio-scientific and socio-political promises. The good life of scientific modernity should be 
accessible to everyone. This at least constitutes the promise of modern democracy. In The 
Sopranos it becomes corrupted as the cheap materialism, worse still, ruthless violence and 
exploitation of the mob. 
 The disappointment with this promise manifests itself precisely in the decision to 
wait: the modern drama of action and contemplation goes empty-handed; is in itself 
disappointing. The man from the country-side obeys the guard and keeps waiting until he has 
become old, bearded and frail—close to dying. At this point the guard again intervenes and 
informs the man from the country-side that no-one else would have had access to the law but 
he. At this moment, however, the information that the door-keeper hands down to him, has 
become useless news, because the man has been waiting for almost all his life for this insight 
which now has lost all practical value for him. When it reaches him he is as good as dead. He 
cannot act on the information. As in Beckett’s play waiting has become an end in itself empty 
of significance.  
 This apparent emptiness of public significance is what George Steiner referred to 
when he coined the expression and his book title The Death of Tragedy (1961). Steiner first 
defines the ancient roots of the tragic by a certain irrationalism but then goes on to argue that 
modernity inaugurates the death of tragedy by depriving drama of public significance. There 
is at least the potential for paradox here because the supposedly modern withdrawal of sense 
and reason is already part of its pre-modern foundations (i.e. the irrational). Steiner allocates 
reason and justice to the Biblical tradition which he contrasts with the blind necessity that 
governs the tragic culture of ancient Greece. The Biblical hero here par excellance is Job: 
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God has made good the havoc wrought upon His servant, he has compensated Job for 
his agonies. But where there is compensation, there is justice, not tragedy. This 
demand for justice is the pride and burden of the Judaic tradition. Jehovah is just, 
even in his fury. Often the balance of retribution or reward seems fearfully awry, or 
the proceedings of God appear unendurable slow. But over the sum of time, there can 
be no doubt that the ways of God to man are just. Not only are the just, they are 
rational. The Judaic spirit is vehement in its conviction that the order of the universe 
and of man’s estate is accessible to reason.37   
   
According to Steiner a rational, ordered and just world is incompatible with tragic drama. His 
account of Job and the Biblical tradition, is, however open to criticism. To be sure from a 
strictly structural perspective, the book of Job is not a tragedy but a comedy. The book opens 
with suffering and ends with compensation for this suffering as Steiner rightly points out. 
Steiner here follows Northrop Frye who in his Anatomy of Criticism (1957) argues that Job 
aspires to be a tragic Greek hero but fails: “The Book of Job is not a tragedy of the 
Promethean type, but a tragic irony in which the dialectic of the divine and the human nature 
works itself out. By justifying himself as a victim of God, Job tries to make himself into a 
tragic Promethean figure, but he does not succeed.”38 He does not succeed because the God 
of the Bible is just and rational rather than an irrational Greek deity who allows blind 
necessity to rule.  
Following Frye, Steiner establishes a strong contrast between the moral order of 
Biblical literature and the capricious and rather irrational gods who run the show of Greek 
tragedy. Concentrating on Frye’s point of Job’s failed tragedy, Steiner contrast the Biblical 
literature in its entirety (both Jewish and Christian) with the disturbing blind necessity or 
irrationality which he allocates to the universe of ancient Greece: “Tragic drama arises out of 
precisely the contrary assertion: necessity is blind and man’s encounter with it shall rob him 
                                                          
37 Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), p. 4  
38 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 42.  
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of his eyes, whether it be in Thebes or in Gaza.”39 Steiner argues that our culture has been 
shaped by the optimistic rationalism of Biblical literature rather than by the tragic recognition 
of irrationality with which he characterizes Greek culture: “The evasion of tragedy is a 
constant practice in our own contemporary theatre and film. In defiance of fact and logic, 
endings must be happy. Villains reform and crime does not pay.”40 In contrast to Steiner’s 
rather simplistic account of Hollywood and modern film and drama in general, the villain 
Tony Soprano does not improve. Moreover, Steiner contradicts himself: he first distinguishes 
the tragic culture of ancient Greece as irrational or non-scientific and then goes on to 
condemn the lack of tragedy in modern or contemporary theatre as well as film on the 
grounds of irrationality (in defiance of fact and logic). As Terry Eagleton has recently pointed 
out, Steiner’s theory of tragedy grows out of a certain world view which takes issue with 
those who exult in paradigms of progress and cultural improvement: 
For obituarists of tragedy like George Steiner, only tragic world-views can finally 
sustain legitimately tragic works of art. If the modern epoch has witnessed the death 
of tragedy, it is among other things because two dominant Weltanschauungen, 
Marxism and Christianity, are judged by Steiner (mistakenly, as we shall see) to be 
inhospitable to tragic insight.41 
 
What, however, would qualify as tragic world-views? In Steiner’s and ironically Eagleton’s 
more recent approach too, tragedy starkly contrasts with science and rationality. Whereas 
tragic world-views emphasize the irrational (Steiner’s blind necessity in Greek culture), the 
non-tragic seems to be modern, because it comes across as rational and scientific.  
Tragedy remains mired in the suffering of the body and the imponderable fate of 
embodied existence, subject to illness, decay and death. In continuity with what he 
                                                          
39 Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, p. 5. 
40 Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, pp. 135-36. 
41 Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 10. 
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mistakenly sees as the right-wing agenda of his opponent Steiner, Eagleton emphasizes the 
absence of change, and the timeless persistence of pain. Eagleton does so because he has an 
urgent ethical agenda. He wants to remind us of the persistence of pain in the face of our 
contemporary culture shaped as it is by the assumed smoothness of supposedly painless 
techno-consumerist globalization. Techno-consumerist culture touts the attraction of non-
commitment and tempts us to become infatuated with the rapid, ever-changing array of new 
technological products.  
Eagleton’s insistence on our embodied life subject as it is to illness, decay and 
mortality is all the more relevant in our digital age which differentiates itself from the age of 
analogue technologies precisely by its ability not to produce products which do not 
deteriorate over time: 
[…] it is rather that human history includes the history of the body, which in respect 
to physical suffering has probably changed little over the centuries. No doubt this is 
why the body in pain, despite a few splendidly perceptive accounts of it, has scarcely 
been the most popular of topics in a body-oriented academia, hardly able to compete 
with the sexual, disciplined or carnivalesque body. It confirms much less readily to a 
certain case about historical pliability. And the suffering body is largely a passive one, 
which does not suit the ideologies of self-fashioning. It is of no particular consolation 
to the victims of torture to be told that their anguish is culturally constructed, as it is, 
perhaps, to be told that one’s lowly place in the hierarchies of gender or ethnicity is a 
changeable historical affair. 42  
Eagleton marshals the notion of tragedy in order to foreground “what is perishable, constricted, 
fragile and slow-moving about us, as a rebuke to culturalist or historicist hubris.”43 Historicism 
partakes of the culturalist assumptions of poststructuralism and reads bodies in terms of 
arbitrary constructions which are subject to historical change or self-refashioning.  The body 
in pain, however, cannot easily be transformed via new signifying practices. This is Eagleton’s 
point about the enduring relevance of the tragic in a culture that emphasizes change towards 
                                                          
42 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, p. xiv. 
43 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, p. xvi. 
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ever more perfect and smoothly run scientific improvements like the contemporary workings 
of the not to be worn down digital in contract to what preceded it:  analogue technology. Do 
these technological improvements which help facilitate the availability and non-deteriorating 
quality of our consumption of visual and textual data (i.e. the digital) render social and 
embodied issues like poverty, suffering and death issues with which we no longer need to be 
preoccupied because they have been overcome?  
 Beckett’s Waiting for Godot and Kafka’s parable Before the Law highlight the non-
fulfilment of modern social, political, intellectual and economic promises. Estragon and 
Vladimir remain down and outs. They are waiting for Godot but they encounter Pozzo who 
exploits and degrades his servant and companion Lucky. The bleak twist here is that Lucky can 
count himself lucky precisely because of his desperate condition in which he has abandoned 
all expectations for a better future. As we have seen it is precisely such expectancy which keeps 
Vladimir and Estragon (as well as Kafka’s naïve man from the countryside) enthralled to the 
futility of waiting.  
 Modern tragedy and drama makes us aware of new issues, questions and disturbing 
discoveries. One such disturbing discovery is indeed Beckett’s phenomenon of waiting: of 
promises and expectations which are not to be fulfilled. Steiner not only denies that Beckett’s 
drama is tragic; he goes so far to deny that it could be called dramatic: “Beckett’s writing is 
‘anti-drama’; he is showing, with a kind of queer Irish logic, that one can bar from the stage all 
forms of mobility and natural communication between characters and yet produce a play.”44 
Steiner refuses to realize how this lack of mobility constitutes a crucial aspect of tragedy within 
modern culture. Modernity is premised precisely on the promise of mobility and meaningful 
change—a transformation of class barriers such Miss Julie attempts to carry out in Strindberg’s 
                                                          
44 Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, p. 350. 
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play. What happens if this promise turns out to be illusory? Modern tragedy after Strindberg 
addresses the anxiety which informs this question.  
Steiner’s dismissal of Beckett’s work as non-tragic and anti-dramatic is due to the 
radical opposition which Steiner posits between the rationality or science and tragedy. 
Beckett’s innovation to the dramatic repertoire vitiates a notion of tragedy which seems to be 
characterized by the absence of new discoveries. More recently Eagleton too employs the term 
tragedy to emphasize the persistence of timeless issues and in order to take issue with the urge 
for innovation and scientific construction which he sees manifested in poststructuralist theory 
(see the quote above).  
 What I am proposing here as the concluding argument of this article is that Modern 
Tragedy is not an oxymoron. Why the two notions appear to be oxymoronic in the first place 
is due to the posited contrast between the scientific or rational and the tragic. It is this 
misleading dichotomy which Steiner has provocatively established and which keeps haunting 
the critical consciousness of even those like Eagleton who dismiss The Death of Tragedy as 
reactionary. Eagleton too characterizes, as we have seen above, the tragic as the non-
changeable, the non-innovative, the timeless, in short, the non-modern. This is not to dismiss 
the powerful point Eagleton is making about the tragic as an awareness of the persistence of 
pain, death and poverty throughout history. It is, however, to questions the rather rigid 
association of tragedy with the non-scientific, the changeless and the repetitive—in short to 
unsettle the common equation of the tragic with fate and irrational determinism.  
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